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RESTRAINT OR EXPULSION OF AN UNRULY
DEFENDANT -

DEPRIVATION OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
INTRODUCTION

The right of a defendant in a criminal case to confront his
accusers at his trial was recognized at common law.' Furthermore, this safeguard, as well as the right to be present at trial,
is guaranteed by either constitutional or statutory law in most
jurisdictions in this country. 2 As a corollary to these rights, it
is recognized that an accused has the right to appear at his trial
without restraints.' A perplexing problem arises, however, when
a court is confronted with a recalcitrant defendant who, by his
persistent misconduct in the courtroom, interferes with the orderly progress of a trial. 4 Where the accused insists upon disrupting the courtroom proceedings, the trial judge is faced with
the dilemma of assuring a fair trial to a defendant who, by his
refusal to behave, seems intent upon preventing not only a fair
trial, but any trial at all. Thus, while the constitutional guarantee of due process in criminal proceedings ordinarily encom-5
passes the right of an accused to be present throughout his trial,
to be free to conduct his defense, to appear before the jury without restraints, 6 and to confront and cross-examine his accusers,'
' Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926), where the Court
noted that the right of confrontation is a common law right, and that the
sixth amendment to the Constitution preserves that guarantee but does not
broaden or disturb the exceptions. See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934).
2 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. II, §9 (1870) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1153(a) (1967). For a comprehensive list of the various state statutory and
constitutional provisions guaranteeing this right, see Murray, The Power to
Expel a Criminal Defendant From His Own Trial: A Comparative View,
36 U. COLO. L. REv. 171 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951): "Freedom
from shackling and manacling of a defendant during the trial of a criminal
case has long been recognized as an important component of a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 302. See also Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253
(10th Cir. 1960).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963)
People v. Allen, 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907
(1967) ; People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956) ; People v.
Loomis, 27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938).
5 See, e.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965); In re
Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
6 Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1943), indicating
that the right of an accused to appear without restraints is necessary to
assure that he will not be prejudiced in the eyes of the jury by a connotation of guilt or unlawful inclinations. And in United States ex rel. O'Halloran v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 384 F.2d 997 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 860 (1967), the court states: "Unnecessary portrayal
of a defendant as a criminal may indeed constitute fundamental unfairness."
Id. at 174.
7 See generally In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; In re Nelson's Will,
210 N.C. 398, 186 S.E. 480 (1936).
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it is likewise true that the term "due process" also envisions a
trial conducted in an orderly fashion, according to some estabAs was stated by the District of
lished mode of procedure .
Columbia Court of Appeals:
In administering criminal justice, the court must conduct its
business in an atmosphere of dignity and decorum and there would
be neither if the defendant were allowed to disrupt the proceedings. .. .9

Thus, in addition to society's interest in safeguarding fundamental personal rights of the accused, society also has an interest in assuring fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings
by the maintenance of orderly judicial processes and the preservation of the dignity of the court.' 0 These interests cannot be
achieved without the necessary rules and procedures directed
toward an atmosphere conducive to a prompt trial and an impartial verdict. The question arises as to whether concepts of
fundamental fairness are violated when a court proceeds to deal
with a recalcitrant defendant by ordering him restrained during
the trial, or by expelling him and proceeding in his absence.
THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND

To APPEAR WITHOUT RESTRAINTS

In federal courts, the provisions of the sixth amendment of
the Constitution, granting to an accused the "right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
11guarantees to an accused the
the witnesses against him . ...
right to be present at least during those stages of his trial in12
volving the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
Thus, the leading case of Snyder v. Massachusetts held that an
accused has the right to be present at his trial "whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of
his opportunity to defend against the charge."- In addition,
8 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14, 923) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1869), in which the court warned: "The right of a prisoner to be
present at his trial does not include the right to prevent a trial by unseemly
disturbance". Id. at 774. In Commonwealth v. Reid, 123 Pa. Super. Ct. 459,
187 A. 263 (1936), the court held that the conduct of the defendant was violent, creating an uproar in court, and restraint was necessary to the safety
of the parties and the orderly progress of the trial. See also In re Hunt,
276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
9 Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
10See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. Ct. 159, 206 A.2d 200
(1965) ; People v. Loomis, 27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
3 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934).
The Court further held: "A defendant
in a criminal case must be present at a trial when evidence is offered, for
the opportunity must be his to advise with his counsel . . . and cross-examine
his accusers." Id. at 114.
The Court continued:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy
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rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every
stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the
return of the verdict, and at the imposition
of sentence, except
14
as otherwise provided by these rules.
The right of an accused in a state criminal proceeding to be
present at his trial is recognized through interpretations of the
fourteenth amendment. For example, the sixth amendment
rights of confrontation and cross-examination were recently held
to be enforceable against the states, by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment.Previously, if a defendant in a state court could
show that his absence at any particular stage of his trial deprived him of fundamental fairness, his right to be present was
protected against state interference by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.'
The federal district court in In re
Hunt,17 has summarized the constitutional right of an accused to
be present at his state criminal prosecution as follows:
There is no doubt that 'whenever his [the defendant's] presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his
opportunity to defend against the charge' . . . a defendant has the
right to be present at his trial.
. . . And in Pointer v. State of Texas . . . we held that the confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment including the right
of cross-examination 'is to be enforced against the States under
the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment . . .'.
It is abundantly clear that the in absentia trial proceedings
violated petitioner's right under Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts to be present whenever her presence had a 'relation, reasonaand fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental .

. .

. Its procedure does not run foul of the Fourteenth

Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be
fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner
at the bar.

.

.

. What may not be taken away is notice of the charge

and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense of it.
Id. at 105.
14 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
15 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), held that the "Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is . . . a
fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 403.
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See also United States ex rel. Marelia v.
Burke, 101 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1951), afJ'd, 197 F.2d 856 (3d Cir), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 868 (1952), where the district court stated:
Had his absence been at the direction of the trial court or over defendant's objection, the trial court might well have lost jurisdiction of
the case at that point. The primary basis of such a loss of jurisdiction
would be because of the violation of fundamental concepts of justice
and fairness which the cases uniformly hold are requisites of due
process of law .
Due process of law requires essential fairness and justice in judicial proceedings.
Id. at 619-20.
17 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
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bly substantial, to the fullness of (her) opportunity to defend
against the charge,' and her rights under Pointer and Brookhart to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against her . . ..

In addition to federal constitutional guarantees, the right
of an accused to be present at trial is specifically guaranteed
either by legislative enactments or state constitutions. 9 There is,

however, a difference among the various state jurisdictions as
to the extent to which this right is recognized, some states re20
quiring the presence of the accused at all stages of the trial,
some only at certain critical stages, 21 and others not specifying
any particular stage, but only requiring that the defendant be
given the opportunity to appear and defend.2 2 The state jurisdictions also differ as to whether the right applies in all criminal
proceedings,23 or only in felony or capital cases. 24 Thus, different

to the effect of a denial
results have been achieved with regard
25
of the accused's right to be present.

The right of an accused to appear at his trial without restraints is not guaranteed by any specific provision of the United
States Constitution. However, the right is generally regarded
as an essential element of fair trial, since due process has been
interpreted as embodying fundamental fairness, with the result
that the indiscriminate use of restraints would undoubtedly violate this constitutional precept.2
18 Id. at 119-20.

3

Thus, it has been held that

19 See Murray, The Power To Expel A Criminal Defendant From His
Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 171 (1964).
See, e.g., Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S.E.
20 Id. at 173.
679 (1923), holding that the presence of the accused is required at all stages
of the trial, from arraignment to sentencing, and that the defendant cannot
waive his presence. For a list of other jurisdictions so holding, consult
Comment, Violent Misconduct In The Courtroom - Physical Restraint And
Eviction Of The CriminalDefendant, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 449-50 (1967).
21 See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); In re Hunt,
276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
U.S. 1 (1966); Pointer v.
22 See generally Brookhart v. Janis, 384
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich.
1967) ; Hanley v. State, 80 Nev. 248, 434 P.2d 440 (1967). For a further
list of jurisdictions see Murray, The Power To Expel A Criminal Defendant
From His Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 171, 172
(1964).
23 See, e.g., Hanley v. State, 80 Nev. 248, 434 P.2d 440 (1967) ; People
v. Medcoff, 344 Mich. 108, 73 N.W.2d 537 (1955); Miles v. State, 222 Ind.
312, 53 N.E.2d 779 (1944).
24 See generally Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965) ; State
ex rel. Boner v. Boles, 148 W.Va. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964); Miles v.
State, 222 Ind. 312, 53 N.E. 2d 779 (1944).
25 See, e.g., Hanley v. State, 80 Nev. 248, 434 P.2d 440 (1967) ; Derden
v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 396, 120 S.W. 485 (1909).
26 See, e.g., Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Odell
v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951). In United States ex rel. Marelia
v. Burke, 101 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1951), afJ'd, 197 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 868 (1952), the federal district court, while cautioning
against proceeding with the trial in the absence of the accused, where such
absence occurred either at the direction of the trial court or over the defendant's objections, and pointing out that in such a situation the trial court
could lose jurisdiction of the case because of a violation of society's concepts of fundamental fairness, nevertheless noted: "It appears that the
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"[u]nnecessary portrayal of a defendant as a criminal may indeed constitute fundamental unfairness ' 21 and that, "[i]n a
criminal trial the right of the accused to appear before the jury
without manacles has always been acknowledged . ... "28 The
right of the defendant to be unrestrained is regarded as elementary to the preservation of the defendant's freedom to conduct his defense 2 or to appear before the jury unprejudiced by
restraints that may imply guilt.30 In Shultz v. State,3 1 the court
implied reversible error for the action of bringing an accused,
not yet convicted, into the presence of the jury in convict attire, manacled or shackled. And in Hauser v. People,3 2 the court

stated:
A prejudice might be created in the minds of the jury against
a prisoner who should be brought before them handcuffed and
shackled, which might interfere with a fair and just 33decision of
the question of the guilt or innocence of such prisoner.
THE PROBLEM OF THE UNRULY DEFENDANT

Where the trial court is forced to deal with a defendant who
refuses to behave,' 4 and ordinary disciplinary measures35 have
failed to compel the accused's good behavior during his trial,3 6
it becomes necessary for the court to consider placing the de-

fendant in restraints or ordering his expulsion from the courtroom. The court's decision to utilize either of these measures,
though dependent upon the particular situation confronting the
presence of a defendant at every stage of the proceedings against him is not
an absolute requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment under all circumstances. . . . " Id. at 621.

27 United States ex rel. O'Halloran v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 173, 174
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 384 F.2d 997 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 860 (1967).
28 Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
29 Hauser v. People, 210 Ill. 253, 71 N.E. 416 (1904).
30 See, e.g., Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Shultz v. State, 131 Fla. 757, 179 So. 764 (1938) ; Hauser v. People, 210 Ill.
253, 71 N.E. 416 (1904).
.1131 Fla. 757, 179 So. 764 (1938).
32210 Ill. 253, 71 N.E. 416 (1904).
3 Id. at 266, 71 N.E. at 421.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963)
People v. Loomis, 27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938).
3
5See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963), where
reminders by the judge of the necessity of preserving the dignity of the
court, bailiffs or marshals restraining the accused and warnings by the
court of more stringent disciplinary measures to come, failed to improve
the defendant's behavior. See also People v. Allen, 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d
1, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
36In People v. Loomis, 27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938), the
appellate court described the behavior of the defendant in the trial court:
In the presence of the court and the jury, appellant repeatedly shouted
in a loud voice, using profane and obscene expressions. Appellant, on
numerous occasions, broke away from, and fought with the officers who
were seeking to quiet him, kicked the counsel table, threw himself on
the floor and otherwise conducted himself in an improper manner.
Despite repeated admonitions from the court, he persisted in such conduct until restrained by order of the court.
Id. at 239, 80 P.2d at 1014.
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court, likewise involves a consideration of the constitutional problems involved.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly decided
whether the restraint of a defendant due to his misconduct constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. In United States
v. Davis,31 the court recognized that a defendant's right to appear at his trial may be waived by his misconduct, but the question of a specific constitutional right of prohibiting restraint of
the accused was not argued. However, the question has been
38
frequently passed upon by federal and state appellate courts,
establishing the principle that the trial judge's decision to impose restraints on a recalcitrant defendant does not constitute
a violation of constitutional rights unless it clearly appears that
the decision was so unreasonable under the circumstances as to
deprive the defendant of fundamental fairness, and the accused
is able to show that he was somehow prejudiced thereby.39 For
example, in State v. Roberts,40 the court reversed the defendant's
conviction because it appeared the trial judge ordered restraints
at the request of state prison authorities, as a means of routine
custodial supervision. The court expressed its belief that sound
judicial discretion must be exercised in any application of restraints, that the court does have the power to do so in order to
preserve the processes of trial, but that, once employing re-

straints, the court must clearly and emphatically instruct the
jury to disregard them in arriving at a determination of the
41
defendant's guilt or innocence.
Where the trial court has acted reasonably, there is no
37 25 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1869).
38 See generally United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963);

Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951) ; People v. DeSimone, 9
Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956); Commonwealth v. Reid, 123 Pa. Super.
Ct. 459, 187 A. 263 (1936).
39 See, e.g., United States ex rel. O'Halloran v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 173
(E.D. Pa.), afJ'd, 384 F.2d 997 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 860 (1967).
Generally, imposition of restraints on an unruly defendant will not be held
to have deprived him of a fair trial where it appears that the behavior of
the accused was so disruptive as to justify such discipline, the court first
attempted to control the situation in a less drastic manner, the defendant
was clearly warned that his continued misbehavior would result in his being
restrained, the amount of restraint imposed was consistent with the degree
of misconduct, and the jury was properly instructed that the restraints
were to have no bearing on its determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. See also United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963)
Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
40 86 N.J. Super. Ct. 159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965).
41 See also Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625
(D.C. Cir. 1963),
where the court quoted the trial judge's instruction, as follows:
'Now, the defendant has been before you and I want to admonish you
not to consider his conduct at all in your determination of his guilt or
innocence. You should ignore his conduct because it is not relevant to
the issue here involved ....
So you will put that out of your mind
entirely when you come to determine his guilt or innocence.'
Id. at 627. The court explained that it did not require that such an instruction be given in every case but only when requested by defense counsel.
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question that the decision to restrain the unruly defendant is
best left to its discretion. 42 A rule forbidding the imposition of
restraints, under any circumstances, would place the court in
the position in which the trial judge would be forced to either
discontinue the proceedings until the defendant felt inclined to
behave, to continue in a disorderly atmosphere, or to order the

defendant expelled.

That the court should be forced to await

the accused's pleasure is untenable, 43 and for the court to proceed
during the defendant's continued disruption of the proceedings
could furnish grounds for the accused's later assertion of a

deprivation of procedural due process, in that the trial was conducted in a disorderly manner. 4 Furthermore, to order the expulsion of the defendant carries its own constitutional problems.45 Thus, the response to the defendant's argument that he
could not properly conduct his defense would seem to be that
he had declined, by his actions, to exercise his constitutionally
guaranteed right. The recalcitrant defendant need only be adequately warned that his continued misbehavior will cause a
waiver of his rights. The most important consideration would
appear to be the right of the court to protect its own role as an
orderly tribunal. That a court should be helpless in the face of
an attempt to disrupt or halt its proceedings opposes society's
interest in maintaining its judicial system, and would, indeed,
"produce little less than anarchy.''46
Where the right of the defendant to be present at trial is involved, a more difficult constitutional problem may arise than

that involving restraint of the accused. While some jurisdictions
insist that the defendant be present at every stage of his trial and
that the court cannot proceed in his absence,4 7 other courts have
42

See, e.g., Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951) ; In re

Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967); McDonald v. United States, 89
F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937), established that a determination by a trial judge

to impose restraints was not an abuse of his discretion and was not dependent upon the presence of any or all of the safeguards mentioned above.
In addition, it is generally necessary that the defendant show that actual
harm resulted to him in being so restrained.
43 In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
The court could
declare a mistrial, but such a solution would be futile, since the defendant's
success in disrupting his first trial would undoubtedly encourage him to
employ the same technique in any subsequent trial.
44See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963). It might
also be noted that it ill befits an unruly defendant to complain of having
been deprived of his right to be tried by an impartial jury when the defendant has undoubtedly prejudiced the jury by his own misconduct. An
instruction to the jury directing that it ignore the defendant's conduct and
his restraints when appraising his guilt or innocence should negate any
question of prejudice. But cf. Bruton v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th
Cir. 1967).
42 See text at note 47 infra.

4"United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 931 (2d Cir. 1963).
47 See, e.g., Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S.E. 679 (1923)
State v. Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756 (1922) ; Derden v. State, 56 Tex.
Crim. 396, 120 S.W. 485 (1909).
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established that an accused does not have the absolute right to

be present at every stage of his trial.4 At certain non-critical
stages of the trial, 49 the courts are relatively free to expel the
misbehaving defendant without depriving him of fundamental
fairness, provided that the expulsion is reasonable under the circumstances and the defendant cannot establish that any actual
harm resulted by the trial proceeding in his absence.5 0 On the
other hand, if the accused's "presence has a relation, reasonably
substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against
the charge" 51 or where his right of confrontation and crossexamination is involved, the problem assumes one of constitutional proportions.52 Thus, in speaking of the sixth amendment
right of confrontation and cross-examination, the Supreme Court
has stated: "[I]f there was here a denial of cross-examination
without waiver, it would be constitutional error of the first
magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would
cure it. ' ' 5 3 Similarly, the federal district court in In re Hunt,54
has declared that: "[i]f we were forced to choose between avoidance of punishment entirely, no matter how richly deserved, and
a deprivation of constitutional rights, we would choose . . . the
55
former.
However, it is clear that constitutional rights personal to
the accused may be waived, 56 inter alia, the right of a defendant
to be present at his trial 57 and to confront and cross-examine his
accusers.58 Such waiver may occur not only as a result of the
4sSnyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934) ; United States
ex rel. Marelia v. Burke, 101 F. Supp. 615, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 197
F.2d 856 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 868 (1952).
49 See, e.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965) ; McDonald
v. United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937) ; United States ex rel. Marelia
v. Burke, 101 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 868 (1952). Non-critical stages have been held to be
those merely formal or preliminary, where no specific constitutional rights
of the accused can be violated by denying him the rights to be present.
Conferences between the trial judge and counsel on instructions and purely
legal matters are also included.
5o See, e.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965) ; McDonald
v. United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937).
51 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934).
52 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
53 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
54276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
55 Id. at 121.
56 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309 (1915) ; Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961). For a
comprehensive review of the subject of waiver, see Comment, Waiver Of
Constitutional Rights By Counsel In A Criminal Proceeding, 1 JOHN MAR.
J. PRAC. & PROC. 93 (1967).

19See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; Wells v.
Stallings, 253 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. N.C. 1966).
58 Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 919
(1965), in which the court held: "It has been consistently held that the accused may waive his right to cross-examination and confrontation and that
the waiver of this right may be accomplished by the accused's counsel.."
Id. at 286.
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defendant's express consent to relinquish his rights, but also as
a result of his actions inconsistent with an intent to assert such
rights.59 Since waiver of constitutional rights must meet the
federal standard of the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,"'0 it is suggested that if a
court proposes to expel a disruptive defendant, then certain procedures should be observed in order to establish an effective
waiver of the defendant's right to be present at important stages
of the trial. 61
Hence, the trial judge should make certain that the defendant is aware of his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers, and to appear and defend himself. Furthermore, the
defendant should be warned that continued misconduct will result in a waiver of these rights. Finally, the court should inform
the defendant of the discipline which will result if he persists
in his disruptive antics. Where the accused has been properly
warned, he is then free to make a knowledgeable choice between
reasonable alternatives62 - either he may choose to behave and
remain in the courtroom, or he may choose to continue his mis59See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963); People
v. Allen, 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
See also Pitts v. State,
60 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968) and Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373 (9th
Cir. 1968), where in the latter case the court said: "The Supreme Court of
the United States has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of
constitutional rights. . . . The federal courts are to indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of such fundamental rights." Id. at 376. The
court also set out the guiding principle that to have a waiver of a constitutional right there must be an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. In the case of Zerchawsky v. Beto, 396 F.2d
356 (5th Cir. 1968), while agreeing that constitutional rights may be waived
by conscious decisions of trial strategy, the court also warned: "To be sure,
a defendant can waive only a 'known right or privilege.'" Id. at 359.
61 In Bruton v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), the court
stated the rule that a district court must be required to make a finding that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privileges, and the
court record must disclose it. Id. at 360. As to the theory that, while it is
essential for the court to warn the jury to disregard a defendant's conduct
in assessing his guilt or innocence, it is human nature for a juror to retain
some essence of prejudice towards a misbehaving defendant. The prevailing
view appears in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), where the Court
said: "Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions." Id. at 95. And in Golliher v. United States, 362 F.2d 594, 603 (8th
Cir. 1966), the court expressed the opinion that it must assume the jury was
capable and followed the instructions of the court as bound by oath to do so.
62A problem could arise in those jurisdictions which do not allow any
type of waiver under any circumstances. Where a recalcitrant defendant
insists upon disrupting his trial, and the trial judge is unable, because of
statute or precedent, to expel the accused, the question arises as to whether
the only solution is to have the defendant restrained. In an extraordinary
situation, even restraint might not be the answer to the continuance of an
orderly trial. On the other hand, in the case of a defendant who voluntarily
absents himself from his trial in a jurisdiction which does not allow waiver,
either express or implied, of the defendant's right to be present, the theory
of waiver cannot be utilized. It would seem that the public interest in preserving the integrity and decorum of judicial proceedings should outweigh
a defendant's individual rights where the defendant is assuming an arbitrary
position contrary to public policy and in derogation of the reasons for his
possession of the rights.
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conduct and face the consequence of expulsion. In light of recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court regarding waiver
of constitutional rights, 63 such precautions would appear to be
necessary if the defendant's misconduct is to be regarded as a
waiver of his right to be present, at least at important stages of
his trial.
While an effective waiver may be made of the right to be
present, even at important stages of the trial, it is uncertain
whether the expulsion of a recalcitrant defendant must in all
cases meet the federal standard of waiver in order to avoid constitutional objections. In cases dealing with one type of misconduct, that is, where the defendant voluntarily absents himself from the jurisdiction after trial has begun, it has been uniformly held that the defendant's voluntary absence results in a
loss of his right to be present, without any necessity for determining whether the defendant was aware of the rights he relinquished by such absence.6 4 For example, in Diaz v. United
States,65 the Supreme Court stated the question to be one of:
[B]road public policy, whether an accused . . . can with impunity
defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts
and juries and turn them into a solemn farce. . . . Neither in
criminal nor in civil cases will the law allow a person to take
advantage of his own wrong. 66
Similarly, rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: "In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death,
the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to
'67
and including the return of the verdict.
Most courts have treated the defendant's misbehavior at
trial in the same manner as situations involving his voluntary
absence, and have held that in either case, the right to be present
was lost by the defendant's misconduct.68 An important distinction does exist, however, between the two types of conduct.
Where the defendant has voluntarily absented himself, it is obvious that, since he is not before the court, he cannot be warned
of the constitutional right relinquished by his absence. Nor
should the processes of justice be compelled to await his pleasure.
In the case of the disruptive defendant, however, he is present
before the court, so that the rendering of a warning before expulsion would not unduly burden the court. Such a recommen63 See, -e.g., Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Pitts
v. State, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Bruton v. United States, 375 F.2d
355 (8th Cir. 1967).
64 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 39 Ill.2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968).
65223 U.S. 442 (1912).
66
Id. at 458. See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
67 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
68 See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); People v.
DeSimone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
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dation was expressed in Pearson v. United States,69 a case involving a defendant who was ejected from court after his persistence in disrupting the trial and his expressed desire to absent himself therefrom. The court stated:
We do not, of course, intimate that the trial court may in all
cases proceed without the defendant's presence. If he is in court,
with counsel present, he may waive his right to be present by
expressly indicating a desire to be absent. In such a case, it may be
desirable for the trial judge to inform the defendant of the nature
of the right to be present and of the possible advantages to him of
being present 7 0

Further, in Cross v. United States,71 which also dealt with a defendant whose trial was conducted in absentia, the same court
noted:
'It has been pointed out that courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.

.

.

. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty

responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there
is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.'

.

. .

This

means that where the defendant is available, 'the serious and
weighty responsibility' of determining whether he wants to waive
a constitutional right requires that he be brought before the court,
advised of that right, and
then permitted to make 'an intelligent
2
and competent waiver.'

ILLINOIS POSITION
Illinois has followed the common law by granting every criminal defendant, by constitution and statute, the right to be present
at his trial.1
The Illinois Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
constitutional right to be present at trial, with the qualification
that the guarantee may be waived by the defendant's voluntary
absence.7 4 In addition to holding that a defendant will be held to
have waived the right to be present by voluntarily absenting
himself from the jurisdiction, the Illinois rule appears to be that
an accused may likewise waive this right by his misconduct at
69 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
70Id. at 627-28.
71325

F.2d at 629.

72 Id. at 631.
7 ILL. CONST. art. II, §9 (1870); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §115-3(a)
(1967) ; People v. Weinstein, 298 Ill. 264, 131 N.E. 631 (1921).
74 People v. Steenbergen, 31 Ill.2d 615, 203 N.E.2d 404, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 853 (1965), in which the court stated:
A defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to be present at
his trial and this right can be waived only by the defendant himself.
...It is not only defendant's right to be present, but it is also his duty,
especially where he has been released on bail. ...
...The right to be present and to meet the witnesses are personal
rights which defendant may also waive. Defendant, by being voluntarily absent, waived his right to be present at the trial . . . [and]
he thereby also waived his right to meet the witnesses face to face.
Id. at 618, 203 N.E.2d at 406-07.
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trial. Thus, in People v. DeSimone,75 the accused not only voluntarily absented himself from his trial on various occasions, but
was also expelled from the courtroom for brief periods when he
disrupted the trial by the use of profanity and other acts of misconduct. Although it appeared that his absence was at a noncritical stage, the defendant alleged that the court's action in
proceeding during his absence constituted a violation of his
rights under the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme
Court rejected this contention, stating:
The constitutional privilege relied upon was conferred for the
benefit and protection of an accused. Like many other rights,
however, it may be waived. Thus where a defendant voluntarily
absents himself from a courtroom and refuses to be present for
further proceedings he is deemed to have waived his right and
cannot claim any advantage on account of his absence . ..
The court did not, therefore, exceed its legitimate powers when
it proceeded while Gordon DeSimone voluntarily absented himself
from the trial. The same result must follow under the circumstances attending this defendant's involuntary absence. It is obvious from the record that defendant's removal was necessary to
prevent such misconduct as would obstruct the work of the court;
such misconduct was, in turn, effective as a waiver of the defendant's right to be present. The right to appear and defend is
not given to a defendant to prevent his trial either by voluntary
absence, or by wrongfully obstructing its progress.76
In the case of People v. Allen 7 7 the court was again confronted with a defendant who repeatedly caused trial delays by
words and acts of misconduct. At various stages of the trial,
the court dealt with the defendant by either shackling him, or
ordering him restrained or expelling him from the courtroom.
While agreeing with the defendant's contention that he was entitled to participate in every stage of the trial,7 and further
noting that, where the accused is not present in person, his attorney has no power to waive his right to be present,'7 the court
nevertheless concluded:
The record is replete with rude, boisterous and disrespectful conduct of the defendant toward the court and its orders. The trial
judge was both patient and tolerant, and his exclusion of the
defendant was justified.

.

.

.

It is sufficient to say that the

record reflects defendant's awareness of his right to conduct his
own defense and his deliberate attempt to use this right to obstruct the trial. By such conduct, he waived any constitutional
rights to be present, confront the witnesses against him and conduct his own case. . .. 80
75 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
Ill. App. 2d 216, 245 N.E.2d 41 (1969).

Accord, People v. Durant, 105

People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 533, 138 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1956).
37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
78 d. at 171, 226 N.E.2d at 3.
79
76
77

d.

80 Id. at 171-72, 226 N.E.2d at 3.
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The above Illinois cases would appear to agree with the
majority of jurisdictions in holding that a defendant's misconduct
at trial will constitute a waiver of his right to be present. However, the Illinois Supreme Court recently expressed reservations
with regard to criminal proceedings where the defendant is absent. In People v. Davis,"' the court concluded, by way of dictum, that a defendant, absenting himself from the courtroom
voluntarily after the trial had begun, waived his right to be
present and had thereby authorized the court to proceed in his
absence. Nevertheless, the court quoted with approval the case
of People v. Evans 2 for the the proposition that:
For generations our law has shown an anxious concern lest
any semblance of trial in absentia be sanctioned. . . . And we
should not be quick to hold that the delinquencies of the defendant
will work 3 a forfeiture of a right that has been so carefully safeguarded.
In dealing with the problem of the prejudicial effect on the
jury of viewing a defendant in restraints, the Illinois Supreme
8 4
that a prisoner on trial
Court has stated in Hauser v. People,
before a jury should not be restrained lest it cause prejudice in
the minds of the jurors and interfere with their fair and impartial determination of his guilt or innocence. The Hauser rule,
that the court may not permit a defendant to appear before a
jury shackled or manacled so as to be unable to present his defense, has been modified by DeSimone and further extended by
People v. Allen, 2 in which the Illinois Supreme Court said:
When the court failed in its efforts to have the trial proceed with
dignity and decorum, it ordered defendant removed from the courtroom. ....
Defendant was permitted in the courtroom, shackled, during
the presentation of his defense but was not allowed to conduct his
own defense. The record before us indicates that the trial court
made every effort to control him, and that the shackling appeared
to be a necessary measure to accomplish this end. 86
Therefore, the present Illinois position is in accord with the
majority of other jurisdictions, which hold that the trial judge,
39 Ill.2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968).
21 Ill.2d 403; 172 N.E.2d 799 (1961). It is apropos to question why
a trial court will ordinarily allow a trial to continue in the absence of the
defendant where he was in attendance at least at its inception, but will generally not proceed at all when the defendant has made no personal appearance. It would seem that the rationale in the first instance is that the
court has acquired jurisdiction of the body of the accused and is thus qualified to administer justice even if he subsequently becomes absent. There
is also the implication that the requirement of notice has been met. The
defendant, having been present and later absenting himself, is presumed
to have voluntarily waived his right to be present and thus either expressly
or impliedly authorized the court to proceed in his absence. Any other rule
would result in a monumental slow-down in the judicial process.
83 Id. at 405-06, 172 N.E.2d at 800.
84210 Ill. 253, 265-67, 71 N.E. 416, 421-22 (1904).
85 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
86 Id. at 169-70, 226 N.E.2d at 2-3.
81
82
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in his discretion, shall decide whether or not restraint need be
applied to an accused in the interests both of preserving the dignity of the court and of promoting the orderly progress of justice. The same discretion must be exercised by the trial court
before the expulsion of an unruly defendant. Unless a clear
abuse of discretion is shown, a court of appeals will refuse to
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
CONCLUSION

87
In summary, the doctrine of Snyder v. Massachusetts
would still seem to stand for the proposition that a federal constitutional right may be lost by a defendant's consent or misconduct. Thus, the United States Supreme Court would follow the
Snyder rule of requiring the defendant's presence only to the extent that he receive a fair and just hearing. Further, restraint
or expulsion of a recalcitrant defendant under the proper conditions and in the reasonable discretion of the trial judge would be
deemed proper. One of the elements of this "reasonable discretion" is undoubtedly a knowledgeable waiver, if such was applicable to the circumstances.
Federal appellate courts have generally stated that the trial
judge has extraordinary discretion in maintaining the proper
trial atmosphere and in protecting the safety of officers and
spectators in the courtroom further indicating that an accused
may, and probably does, waive his right to appear, defend and
confront his accusers when his conduct requires him to be restrained or expelled for the purpose of preserving the dignity

and decorum of the court.8 8 The federal standard of waiver re-

quires that the defendant be made aware of his rights and privileges in addition to the ways in which he may lose them if he
continues to flaunt the authority and integrity of the court. In
considering the grounds upon which a defendant who has been
excluded or restrained might assert a violation of constitutional
rights, it might be well to ask: What right is it of which the
defendant has been deprived? By his misconduct he has placed
the court in a position where it can no longer function as a court.
Once he is warned, the choice is the defendant's: if he wishes to
remain in the courtroom and be free of restraints, he must be87

88

291 U.S. 97 (1934).

See, e.g., Hilton v. Peyton, 267 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Va. 1967)
DeWolf v. Waters, 205 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 837
(1953), which states: "The use of guards in the court room during a criminal trial and the necessity of the use of manacles and shackles on the defendant were matters resting within the discretion of the trial court ...
"
Id. at 235.
McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937), held: "Absent
incontrovertible evidence of hurt, the trial court should be permitted to use
such means . . . as the nature of the case . . . shall reasonably call for ..

Id. at 136.
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have himself; if he does not choose to remain orderly, he has, by
his conduct and by weight of present authority, voluntarily
waived his right to be present. Unless the trial judge was guilty
of such abuse of discretion as to shock the conscience and render
the trial fundamentally unfair, it is unlikely that his decision to
expel or restrain an unruly defendant would be overturned.
In those jurisdictions which do not permit any waiver of the
accused's right to be present,8 9 the best, and probably the only
alternative to expulsion, would be to permit the unruly defendant
to remain in the courtroom, but with the application of such restraints as are necessary to allow the court to proceed with its
business in a normal manner, with a proper warning to the jury
that such restraints have no bearing on the accused's guilt or
innocence.9 0
In order that the Illinois courts avoid constitutional difficulties, due to the restraint or expulsion of a recalcitrant defendant, it is suggested that the federal standard of waiver be
applied. Furthermore, the Illinois judiciary should adopt a practice by which the trial judge must warn the defendant that by
his misconduct he may effectively waive his right to be present
and unrestrained at his trial. Finally, the court should determine
whether the defendant clearly understands the meaning of the
judge's warning and of the effect of an involuntary waiver, with
a specific finding made as part of the record of proceedings.
John W. Donahue

80 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892) ; United States
v. Neal, 320 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929
(4th Cir. 1963) ; State v. Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756 (1922).
90 See State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. Ct. 159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965).

